Abstract-In this paper, we propose a joint source-relay precoding scheme to secure an amplify-and-forward multipleinput multiple-output wireless relay network in the existence of a multi-antenna eavesdropper. Different from existing works that only consider some specific signal design to simplify the problem, we take both the direct links from the source to the destination and to the eavesdropper into account, and investigate the general joint signal covariance matrices optimization problem to maximize the secrecy rate, which leads to a difficult non-convex optimization problem. To handle it, we propose a group alternating optimization algorithm to find a solution, which alternately optimizes the signal covariance matrix and the linear precoding matrix at the source and the relay, respectively. For optimizing the linear precoding matrix at the relay, the problem is still non-convex, and we propose a minorization-maximization (MM) method to handle it. The MM method transforms the original non-convex problem into a series of convex problems and guarantees the convergence of a local optimum. For optimizing the signal covariance matrix at the source, we reveal the convex-concave property of the problem, and find its global optimum using a barrier method combined with the Newton iteration. We also provide an initialization method to trigger the algorithm and analyze the convergence and complexity. The numerical results show the computational efficiency and the prominent performance of the proposed algorithm.
The theoretical basis for the physical layer security approach is the notion of secrecy capacity, which is introduced by Wyner in [6] , and generalized by Cheong and Hellman in [7] and by Csiszár and Körner in [8] . Generally, a positive secrecy capacity exists when the legitimate channel (from source to destination) is "better" than the wiretap channel (from the source to the eavesdropper). Although this can not be always guaranteed in wireless communications, we can construct equivalent legitimate and wiretap channels via signal design and power allocation such that the destination has a better equivalent channel than the eavesdropper.
Utilizing the multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) technique is a promising approach to construct a better equivalent legitimate channel [1] . Due to the extra spatial degrees of freedom provided by multiple antennas, the secrecy capacity/ secrecy rate can be greatly improved. The secrecy capacity of a MIMO wiretap channel has been extensively investigated in [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] . Under the sum power constraint, to obtain the secrecy capacity requires to solve a non-convex optimization problem [9] , [11] . In the high signal to noise ratio (SNR) regime, It has been shown in [11] that a transmission scheme based on the generalized singular value decomposition (GSVD) of the legitimate and wiretap channel matrices can achieve the secrecy capacity, which has a closed-form expression, and the optimal power allocation of this scheme has been addressed in [12] . In [13] and [14] , the numerical optimization algorithms are proposed to find a KarushKuhn-Tucker (KKT) solution and the global optimal solution, respectively.
Utilizing the spatial degrees of freedom to improve physical layer security has further been generalized to cooperative/ relay communication systems [4] , [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] . Cooperation of multiple nodes each equipped with a single antenna establishes a virtual MIMO system, wherein some distributed beamforming techniques have been proposed to enhance the security. Secrecy beamforming design and optimization under both amplify-and-forward (AF) [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] and decode-and-forward (DF) [26] [27] [28] relaying protocols have been investigated for various cooperative systems such as one-way [18] [19] [20] [21] , [26] [27] [28] , two-way [22] [23] [24] , and peerto-peer relay networks [25] . However, maximizing the achievable secrecy rate of the cooperative relay system encounters a common mathematical obstacle: a potential non-convex optimization problem. Generally, two alternatives have been proposed by the existing works to make the problem solvable. The first one is to consider some suboptimal schemes. For example, "Null-space beamforming" has been proposed 0090-6778 © 2017 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
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in [18] , [23] , [25] , and [26] to design beanformers in the nullspace of the eavesdroppers' channels. This scheme simplifies the original problem but can only provide strictly suboptimal solutions. The other method is to perform a two-level optimization, where the inner problem is solved by a semidefinite relaxation (SDR) and Gaussian randomness technique, and the outer one involves an exhaustive one-dimensional search [19] . The SDR and Gaussian randomness techniques only provide an approximate solution, and the optimality of the one-dimensional search algorithm depends heavily on the search interval, which is also computationally complex. So far, the optimization problem has not been completely addressed.
As a combination of the MIMO and cooperative relay technologies, the secrecy signal design and optimization of a MIMO relay wiretap channel has also received a lot of attentions [29] [30] [31] [32] [33] [34] [35] [36] , where all the source, relay, destination and eavesdropper are equipped with multiple antennas. One-way DF MIMO relay is considered in [29] [30] [31] [32] , one-way AF MIMO relay is investigated in [33] and two-way MIMO relay networks are studied in [34] . In [35] and [36] , an untrusted MIMO relay scenario is further considered. However, the secrecy rate maximization (SRM) problem here becomes more difficult since the optimization variables are now matrices instead of vectors. Furthermore, since both source and relay are equipped with multiple antennas, joint source-relay precoding optimizations will complicate the problem even further. To simplify the problem, different suboptimal security schemes have been proposed in the aforementioned works by imposing different constraints on the secrecy signal design. For example, motivated by the conclusions in [11] , GSVD precoding and zero-forcing (ZF) precoding based transmissions have been proposed in [29] [30] [31] [32] [33] . The minimum mean square error (MMSE) based criteria has been adopted as an alternative objective instead of the secrecy rate in [34] . In [35] , and [36] , only a single data stream is permitted to be transmitted using beamforming. All these works only partially solved the SRM problem of a MIMO relay network. So far, to the best of our knowledge, how to maximize the achievable secrecy rate under a general MIMO relay wiretap channel without any specific constraint on the transmit signal is still an open problem, which motivates this work.
In this paper, we propose a comprehensive optimization framework to improve the secrecy performance in term of secrecy rate in a general AF MIMO relay network by joint source-relay precoding. Compared with the existing works mentioned above, the novelty and main contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows: 1) We investigate the secrecy transmission under a so-called symmetric MIMO relay wiretap channel, where both the destination and eavesdropper receive both the signals transmitted from the source and relay in the first phase and second phase, respectively. In other words, both the direct links and the relay links are taken into consideration. 1 Furthermore, we consider the general signal covariance design at the source and the general linear precoding scheme at the relay, rather than focusing on any specific precoding scheme, such as GSVD/ZF precoding, or single-stream transmission. It should be noted that this general scenario makes the direct optimization difficult to handle, since the signal covariance matrix R R R and the linear precoding matrix W W W are coupled in a complex form in the objective function.
2) We propose a systematic optimization framework to maximize the achievable secrecy rate of the MIMO relay wiretap channel via joint source-relay precoding. The basic idea is to alternately optimize the linear precoding matrix W W W at the relay and the signal covariance matrix R R R at the source while fixing the other one as a constant matrix, i.e., group alternating optimization (GAO). For the subproblem of optimizing W W W while fixing R R R, a quadratic lower bound of the object function is constructed and a minorization-maximization (MM)-based algorithm is proposed to iteratively solve this subproblem. During each iteration, a convex problem is solved by the bisection method, and thus the proposed algorithm enjoys a quite low complexity. For the subproblem of optimizing R R R while fixing W W W , it can be transformed as a convex-concave optimization problem whose saddle point is the global optimal. This saddle point is completely characterized by the KKT conditions, which can be solved by the barrier method combined with Newton iteration. In addition, the convergence of our proposed GAO algorithm is guaranteed.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Section II, we present the system model of the symmetric MIMO relay wiretap channel, and show that the direct optimization of the secrecy rate is hard to tackle. In Sections III and IV, the linear precoding scheme at the relay and the signal covariance design at the transmitter are provided, respectively. In Section V, the proposed GAO algorithm is detailed and an initialization method is given. In Section VI, the simulation experiments are taken to illustrate the performance. Finally, Section VII concludes the paper.
Notations: 
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
We consider a wireless relay network in which a legitimate source wishes to send secret information to its destination under the existence of a passive eavesdropper, with the help of a relay node, as depicted in Fig. 1 . Each node in the whole network is equipped with multiple antennas, and is subjected to the half-duplex constraint. N S , N D , N R and N E denote the number of antennas possessed by the source, the destination, the relay and the eavesdropper, respectively.
We consider a general symmetric MIMO relay wiretap channel where both the destination and the eavesdropper can receive signals from the source and the relay, i.e., both the direct and relay links exist. One round of the information transmission requires two phases. The source transmits in the first phase while all the other three nodes listen, and in the second phase the relay re-transmits the received signal after some processing. In this paper, we consider the case where the relay node adopts an AF, namely the non-regenerative protocol, where it directly performs a linear transform to the signal received in the first phase without decoding and then re-transmits it. All the channels go through the quasi-stationary flat fading, with channel matrices denoted by Fig. 1 .
In the first phase, the secret information vector s s s = [s 1 , s 2 , · · · , s N S ] T with the covariance matrix R R R = E s s ss s s H is broadcasted by the source. The relay, the destination and the eavesdropper will receive
y y y
respectively, where i ∈ {D, E} is the index for the destination and eavesdropper, n n n R ∼ CN (0 0 0, σ 2 R I I I N R ), and n n n In the second phase, the received signal y y y R at the relay is linearly transformed by a precoding matrix W W W ∈ C N R ×N R and re-transmitted to the destination, i.e., x x x R W y W y W y R =
W W W (H H H R s s s + n n n R ).
The received signals at the destination and the eavesdropper are y y y
respectively, where n n n
E} are the additive noise at the destination and the eavesdropper in the second phase and without loss of generality, we also assume that σ 2 D,2 = σ 2 E,2 = 1. The average transmission power at the relay is thus given by
Both the destination and the eavesdropper can combine the signals received over the two consecutive phases to get the overall received signal as
where we have y y y i y y y
We emphasize that the wiretap channel models (4) are the general model for a MIMO wiretap channel taking all the wireless links into consideration. Our goal is to maximize the achievable secrecy rate with Gaussian input and the random encoder, which is defined as
where [a] + = max(0, a), and I (·; ·) is the mutual information under the Gaussian input. Both the destination and the eavesdropper have equivalent MIMO channels as show in (4), so we have
where
are the covariance matrices of n n n D and n n n E , respectively. Substituting (4) and (7) into (6), we have
J J J I I I + H H H R R R RH H H H R and ( * ) is due to the fact that A A A B B B C C C D D D = |A A A| D D D − C C C A A A −1 B B B with

J J J D (R R R) I I I + H H H R R R RH H H H R − H H H R R R RH H H H D I I I + H H H D R R RH H H H D
−1
H H H D R R RH H H H R
Similarly
To maximize the secrecy rate via jointly optimizing the signal covariance matrix R R R at the source and the linear precoding matrix W W W at the relay, we establish an optimization problem given in (11) on the top of this page, where P S,M AX and P R,M AX are the power budget at the transmitter and the relay, respectively. Obviously, the objective function of problem (11) is a complicated nonlinear non-convex function of R R R and W W W . Therefore, the direct optimization of SRM problem is very difficult. In the existing literature, some special structures are imposed on R R R and W W W to simplify the problem, but a systematic algorithm to solve the problem under general R R R and W W W is still absent. In the following sections, we propose a GAO algorithm to maximize the secrecy rate via solving a series of subproblems optimizing W W W and R R R iteratively.
III. PRECODING MATRIX OPTIMIZATION AT THE RELAY
In this section, we first optimize the precoding matirx W W W at the relay while fixing the signal covariance matrix R R R at the source. By taking R R R as a constant matrix, the optimization problem in (11) becomes (12) given on the top of this page, where
We see that although we have fixed R R R, the objective function still has a complicated expression, which makes the subproblem non-convex and hard to solve. To handle it, we propose a MM optimization method. The MM method is an iterative algorithm to solve the general maximization problem. The main idea behind is that instead of maximize the original complex objective function directly, it maximizes a series of the approximation of the objective function. The approximate objective function should satisfy some specific conditions, and usually enjoys a simple structure, which means it is easy to maximize. If properly constructed, any limit point of the iterative solution generated by the MM method is a local optimal point of the original problem. A brief introduction of the MM method is provided in Appendix A.
To utilize the MM method, we first introduce a quadratic lower bound of the objective function of (12) as the approximate objective function via the following lemma. (12) is given by
with 
due to the fact that
The KKT condition of problem (17) is given by
where λ is the dual variable corresponding to the power constraint. According to (18a), we have w w w (λ) = ( + λT T T ) −1 ν ν ν. Then, we aim to find the optimal dual variable λ * such that (18b) and (18c) are satisfied. From (18b), if λ = 0 and w w w (0) H T T T w w w (0) ≤ P R,M AX , then we have λ * = 0 and w w w opt = w w w (0), where w w w opt is the optimal solution of (17) . Otherwise, we have to find a λ * such that
To solve (19), we rewrite the left-hand side of this equation as
where T T T In this section, we fix W W W to optimize the signal covariance matrix R R R in (11) . The objective function becomes ln
I I I + H H H D R R RH H H H D |I
which seems still complicated. It is interesting to note that this scenario is equivalent to a relay system with a fixed AF matrix W W W . Therefore, it is equivalent to a MIMO channel wiretapped by a multiple-antenna eavesdropper. The optimization problem (11) can be written as a more compact form as max R R R 0 0 0 ln
where (22) is difficult since it is not a convex problem in the general case. However, after some manipulations, the problem can be reformulated to get a minimax representation, which can be expressed as the following lemma. 
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for any fixed R R R the equivalent objective function f (K K K , R R R) is convex in K K K , and for any fixed K K K , it is concave in R R R.
Proof: This conclusion is shown in [11] . The convex property of R R R and the concave property of K K K can be verified from the perspective of the Hessian matrices.
By introducing a new variable K K K , Lemma 2 provides an equivalent minimax optimization problem, whose global optimum is the saddle-point. The saddle-point is fully characterized by the KKT conditions. In the following, we use the barrier method combined with the Newton iteration to obtain the solution of the KKT conditions.
The key idea of the barrier method is to construct a so-called barrier function to use a soft instead of hard constraints by augmenting the objective with the barrier functions responsible for each inequality constraint. In our problem, we first insert the inequality constraints into the objective with the logarithm barrier function and we obtain a new objective function as
H H RH R H R H H I I I + H H H 2 R H R H R H H
where t is the barrier parameter, and the optimization problem becomes
Now (26) is an unconstrained minimax problem, and the saddle point is the global optimal which is completely characterized by the KKT conditions. To formulate the KKT condition, since the arguments R R R and K K K are Hermitian matrices, we first span them as vectors. Denote r r r u u u T , z z z T , z z z H T as all the entries of R R R where u u u contains the diagonal real elements and z z z contains the lower triangle complex elements in R R R,
Then the vectorization of R R R and K K K can be written as the following linear transformations
are four unique matrices that fulfill the linear transformation in (27) and (28) . For more details about these permutation matrices, please refer to [40] .
With the above notations, the KKT condition of (26) can be expressed as
We can further rewrite (29) in the so-called residual vector form as
Using the Newton method to find the solution of the KKT condition of (26) , the Newton update is given by
where is a proper step size and ω ω ω is the Newton step. The Newton step is given by
The detailed expressions of the second order derivatives in (33) are listed in the Appendix C. The step size can be obtained by the backtracking line searching [14] , [42] .
With (31)- (32), we can solve the KKT condition of (26) for a fixed t. By gradually increasing t, we can obtain the approximation of the solution to the KKT condition of (23) with an increasing accuracy. The detailed algorithm for optimizing R R R with fixed W W W is summarized in Algorithm 2 in which t is the parameter of the barrier method, M R R R,M AX denotes the maximum iterative times of the Newton iteration for each t, ξ is a small positive number determining the accuracy of the Newton iteration and t M AX is the upper bound of t which guarantees a proper accuracy for the final result of Algorithm 2. Any feasible R R R and K K K can be accepted in the initialization step, and in Section V, we propose an applicable method to initialize R R R which guarantees a positive secrecy rate at the very beginning.
Algorithm 2 Optimizing R R R
Compute w w w according to (32); 6: Find a proper step size by backtracking method; 7: ω ω ω = ω ω ω + ω ω ω; 8: if ||θ θ θ (w w w)|| ≤ ξ then 9: Break; 10: end if 11: end for 12: t = κt; 13: end while
V. GAO ALGORITHM AND INITIALIZATION
A. Summary of the Algorithm
Based on Sections III and IV, we establish a GAO method to optimize the whole system listed in Algorithm 3. Each iteration involves two sub-problems, i.e., optimizing the precoding matrix W W W and the signal covariance matrix R R R. In Algorithm 3, we use N AO to denote the iterative times, N AO,M AX to denote the maximal iteration number, and η to determine the accuracy of the algorithm. 
B. Initialization of the GAO
In this part, we will provide our initialization method for Algorithm 3. Before giving the result, we first list two propositions.
Proposition 1: If H H H H D H H H D − H H H H E H H H E
has at least one positive eigenvalue, there always exists a positive secrecy rate in this system. [9] . In this MIMO relay system, we can further express this condition as
Proposition 2: If both H H H H D H H H D − H H H H E H H H E
where the second equality follows from applying the matrix inverse lemma. As we can see,
once H H H H D H H H D − H H H H E H H H E
has at least one positive eigenvalue, we can always obtain a positive security rate by forcing W W W to 0 0 0.
However, if H H H H D H H H D − H H H H E H H H E
According to the above two propositions, we establish an initialization method for Algorithm 3 which provides a quite good initial point which usually gives us a positive initial secrecy rate.
If there exist some positive eigenvalues, choose the corresponding eigenvectors as the columns of W W W 0 . If all the eigenvalues are non-positive, then let W W W 0 = 0 0 0. In this case, the operations of optimizing W W W in Algorithm 3 can be directly skipped because the second hop cannot help to enhance security.
2) Initialize R R R 0 : Do the Eigenvalue Decomposition 
C. Convergence
In Algorithm 3, define the secrecy rate obtained at the k th iteration as R s,k , then as the iteration goes, we obtain a sequence of secrecy rate, i.e., R s,k |k = 1, 2, · · ·, ∞ . As we alternately optimize R R R and W W W , this sequence will be nondecreasing, which means
Besides, due to the fact that the secrecy rate in the considered relay network is bounded above under the power constraint, i.e., there exists a positive value R * satisfying R s,∞ ≤ R * , the secrecy rate generated by Algorithm 3 will converge to a limit point absolutely.
D. Complexity Analysis
The performance of the proposed GAO method mainly depends on the performance of Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2, therefore we provide the complexity analysis for these two algorithms.
1) Algorithm 1:
In each iteration of Algorithm 1, the computational consumption mainly consists of two parts. The first part is the calculation of μ i and D i,i . The second part is the process of the bisection method. For calculating μ i and D i,i , the major complexity lies in the multiplication, inverse, eigenvalue decomposition and Kronecker product of matrices. Among these operations, the most complex operation is the eigenvalue decomposition of T T T
R -by-N 2 R matrix and the the computational cost for this operation is o N 6 R . Using bisection method to search the null point of (20), we need calculate the value of (20) at least log 2 (P r /ς ) times, where ς denotes the required precision. The cost of calculating the value of (20) is o N 2 R , therefore the cost of the bisection method is o log 2 (L/ς ) N 2 R .
2) Algorithm 2:
For each fixed t, Algorithm 2 reduces to the Newton method, and the computational cost in each Newton iteration mainly lies in the calculation of the Newton direction ω ω ω and a proper step size . To obtain ω ω ω, the complexity is about where o 1 and o 2 are the cost of constructing the coefficient matrix and solving the linear equation, respectively. Using the backtracking algorithm to obtain a proper step size , we need repeatedly calculate the norm of the residual vector at different value of . The computation of the residual vector involves four matrix inverse operations and several matrix multiplication operations, and their computational cost are
, respectively. To summarize, the computational cost in each Newton iteration is ι 1 + χ(ι 2 + ι 3 + ι 4 ), where χ is the iterative steps in backtracking line searching and ι 4 is the computational cost of the norm operation.
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we give the simulation results to evaluate the performance of the proposed GAO algorithm. All the channel coefficients are randomly generated as complex zero-mean Gaussian random variables with unit covariance.
A. Convergences
In this subsection, we illustrate the convergences of the proposed algorithms. Since the GAO algorithm (Algorithm 3) is mainly based on Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2, thus we firstly show the convergence of these two algorithms, respectively.
The three random realizations of Algorithm 1 are given in Fig. 2 , where we can see the convergence of Algorithm 1, and according to our simulation, it usually converges to its stationary point around 30 iteration steps. Fig. 3 shows the convergence of Algorithm 2 under one random channel realization, where we set N S = 4, N D = 4, N E = 2 and N R = 6. The initial R R R and W W W are generated according to Section V that satisfies the power constraint. From the simulation result, especially in viewing the norm of residual vector, the algorithm converges with a quite fast speed for each unique t, generally in 10 Newton steps, and with the augment of t, the secrecy rate is increasingly closer to its upper bound, and thus the algorithm converges. In most cases of our simulation, Algorithm 2 usually converges within around 50 Newton steps.
Finally, we give some convergence results of our proposed GAO scheme in Fig. 4 . Three random channel realizations are demonstrated. It can be seen that, in all the cases, the required number of iterations is less than 3. In fact, In the most cases of our simulation, the proposed GAO method converges very fast, which also verifies the efficiency of our proposed GAO method. From this figure, we also obtain a heuristic idea to realize the GAO algorithm in a distributed manner. The main content of this idea is that we only do one step of the GAO algorithm. The reason for doing in this way is that even when we only finish the first iteration of the algorithm, the obtained secrecy rate is quite close to the final secrecy rate, as the figure shows. Therefore, only doing one step of the GAO algorithm will not lead to much performance loss. Based on this idea, we can realize the GAO algorithm as follows,
1) The relay node first initializes W W W and then transmits W W W to the source node; 2) With the initialized W W W , the source node solves R R R according to Algorithm 2; 3) The source node transmits R R R along with the confidential massage to the relay node; 4) With the optimized R R R, the relay node optimizes W W W according to Algorithm 1, and once the optimal W W W is obtained, the relay can retransmit the confidential massage to the destination. Compare to run the algorithm until it fully converges, this method is more efficient but does not cause much performance loss, besides, this method only needs to exchange the 
B. Performances Under Different Antennas Settings
In this subsection, we check the performance of the GAO method in terms of the achievable secrecy rate under different antennas settings. In our simulation, we set t 0 = 50, t M AX = 5 × 10 8 , M R R R,M AX = 10, M W W W ,M AX = 100, = 10 −4 , ξ = 10 −8 and N AO,M AX = 15, and the simulation results are obtained by averaging over 100 channel realizations, unless specified. Fig. 5 illustrates the secrecy rates against the maximum power of the source node under different numbers of antennas at the relay node, while the power budget of the relay node is fixed as P R,M AX = 30 dBm. In the simulation, we choose the number of antennas as N S = 4, N D = 4, N E = 4, and N R = 4, 6, 8, respectively. The figure shows that increasing the number of antennas at the relay node can greatly improve the secrecy rate. This is because more spatial degrees of freedom facilitate a larger legitimate rate and a smaller eavesdropping rate, and thus enlarge the secrecy rate. Fig. 6 illustrates the influence of the antenna numbers of all the source, the destination and the eavesdropper. In the simulation, we set P R,M AX = 30 dBm. As we can see in the figure, by increasing N S from 3 to 4, there is a huge improvement on the secrecy rate. This is because the design of R R R has a significant impact on the secure transmission both in the first phase and the second phase, and equipping with more antennas at the source strongly enhances its ability to improve the legitimate rate in the both phases. We also check the performance when N D = 3, 5, respectively. It shows that as the number of antennas of the destination increases, the secrecy rate does improve correspondingly. At last, we simulate the case where N E = 2. Compared with N E = 3, when N E = 2, the secrecy rate is much improved, due to the reduced capacity of the eavesdropper. Fig. 7 illustrates the secrecy rates against the maximum power of the relay, while the maximum power of the source is fixed as 9 dBm, 15 dBm and 21 dBm, respectively. In the simulation, we set N S = 4, N D = 4, N E = 2, and N R = 8. When P S,M AX = 9 dBm, the secrecy rate quickly converges to a constant due to the bottleneck on the available power of the source. By increasing P S,M AX from 9 dBm to 21 dBm, the secrecy rate is greatly improved.
C. Performance Comparison With Existing Algorithms
In this subsection, we compare our GAO scheme with the existing algorithm aiming at dealing with the SRM problem (11) .
We first compare the performances of the proposed GAO algorithm with the gradient descent algorithm. Some details about the gradient descent algorithm are provided in Appendix D. In the simulation, we set N S = N D = N R = 4, N E = 2, P S,M AX = 15 dBm and P R,M AX = 30 dBm, and the same initialization method are used for both the GAO algorithm and the gradient descent algorithm. We compare the secrecy performances of this two algorithms under 20 randomly generated channel realizations and we plot the simulation results in Fig. 8 . From the figure, we can see that the GAO algorithm is distinctly better than the gradient descent algorithm in term of the secrecy rate. In fact, we have done a lot of simulations, and our GAO algorithm almost always shows better performance.
We also compare the proposed GAO algorithm with the GSVD-ZF-SVD-based algorithm [21] in the case where no direct link between the source and the destination exists. In the simulation, we set N S = 4, N D = 4, N E = 2, and N R = 8. Fig. 9 illustrates the secrecy rates against the maximum power of the source while the maximum power of the relay is fixed as 9 dBm, 15 dBm and 21 dBm, respectively. The solid lines and the dash lines are computed by our proposed GAO scheme and the GSVD-ZF-SVD scheme, respectively. As we can see from Fig. 9 , our proposed GAO scheme significantly outperforms the GSVD-ZF-SVD scheme in terms of the secrecy rate. This is due to the extra structural constraints imposed on the signal covariance matrix and the precoding matrix in the GSVD-ZF-SVD scheme.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, the SRM problem is investigated in a general two-hop AF MIMO wireless relay networks in the existence of a multi-antenna eavesdropper with direct links. We propose a GAO method to optimize the signal covariance matrix at the source node and the linear precoding matrix at the relay node alternately. We transform each sub-problem to make them solvable, and get a monotonically increasing sequence of the secrecy rates which finally converges to a limit point. The numerical evaluation results are provided to show the efficiency of the proposed secrecy scheme. 
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then any limit point of the sequence {x x x k } generated by the MM method is a local optimal point of the original problem. For more details about the MM method, please refer to [43] and [44] . 
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